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vi Abstract Russia has strategic importance from an economic and political perspective with its substantial energy resources, military strength, international connections, and influence.
Currently the world's number two oil producer and number one natural gas producer, the state has strengthened control over its energy production and distribution. In addition, Russian companies have negotiated controlling stakes in refineries, pipelines, and the ports of neighboring countries. Analysts are split over how to assess Moscow's motives and the impact Russian policies will have on Western markets.
To gain insight into Russia's intentions, along with the key trends and events that may shape the next 15 years, this paper will describe four scenarios involving Russia, the US, and EU in the year 2025. In order to provide realistic snapshots of a future Russia, this research will review Moscow's economic and political policies and examine recent events impacting Europe and the US. These scenarios intend to engage readers to reevaluate their assumptions about the future from a shared reference of discussion. The goal is to raise awareness and enable better strategic decision making to prompt the best outcome for Western and Russian markets and security interests.
Chapter 1 -Introduction
Western observers are divided over how to assess Russia's economic and political motives. Currently the world's number two oil producer and number one natural gas producer, Russia catapulted from being the twentieth largest economy in the world to the seventh over an eight year period. 1 The state has strengthened control over its energy resources claiming ownership of 90% of Russian natural gas and 30% of oil production. 2 Beyond its borders, Russian companies have tried to negotiate for a controlling stake in pipelines, ports, and storage facilities of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 3 In recent years, it has become apparent Moscow is using energy transit procedures and resources as a tool of foreign policy toward some members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). There is evidence the Kremlin has interrupted natural gas and oil flows to neighboring countries following political disagreements. 4 Some analysts argue Moscow's actions are strictly associated with smart business practices and the disruptions were not politically motivated. 5 However, based on its recent actions toward Ukraine and other nations, as well as its strategic partnerships with other oil producing countries, it is evident Russia is seeking to be a principal force in the global energy market and could threaten US and European interests.
Issue Background and Significance
According to a 2008 Congressional report, Russia will play a dominant role in determining the national security environment in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 6 Moscow has an important role in future arms control, the fight against terrorism, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As a major energy producer and consumer, its trends and policies also affect US energy markets and economic welfare. 7 On one hand, an increase in its production and exportation could ease dependence on US energy resources in the Atlantic and Pacific Basins; however, there is concern that the government's desire to further control the energy industry could stifle the amount of oil available globally. 8 Phase IV: ACT. Explore and test the possible and desirable futures to improve decisions. This research paper will not employ Phase IV. The goal is to generate discussion and enable development of long-term policies, strategies, and plans to bring the desired future. 15 Phase V: MONITOR. Identify and track a few leading indicators that will signify if a particular scenario is starting to unfold, causing some implications to rise in importance while some uncertainties evolve into predetermined elements. 16 Chapter 4 will discuss some of the signs of change.
In the past five years there has been an increase in the number of books, news stories, journal articles, and government reports analyzing Russia's growth in the energy market and speculation about its impact on global energy security. This section analyzes Russia's recent policies and actions, and their impact on Europe and the US. The literature review explores the driving forces that will shape each future scenario discussed in Chapter 3.
Russia's Economic and Energy Overview
Following Soviet disintegration, energy resources became Russia's key method for rebuilding its economy, military capabilities, and foreign reach. 17 It is the world's largest producer and exporter of natural gas, the second largest producer and exporter of oil following Saudi Arabia, and third largest energy consumer. 18 Its economy is heavily dependent on energy exports, which account for 50% of total state revenues. 19 The country exports the majority of its oil to Europe for heating; the US imports roughly 3% of Russian oil. 20 The US business community has asserted that structural problems and inefficient government regulations are the major reason for low levels of trade. 21 The CIS is the largest importer of Russian natural gas;
however, Moscow has started shifting exports to serve the rising demand in the EU, as well as Turkey, Japan, and other Asian countries. 22 From 1999 to 2007, the increase in world price of oil and gas enabled its real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to grow at an average rate of 6.7%
per year, and virtually eliminate foreign debt. 23 This dependency on exports has made Russia vulnerable to fluctuations in world oil prices, a $1 per barrel increase in the price of crude oil for a year results in a $3 billion increase in the nominal GDP. 24 The state budget remains balanced only when oil prices remain at or above $70 per barrel, 25 thus the recent decline to approximately $40 per barrel has forced the Kremlin to dig into accumulated reserves to meet its obligations and prop up sinking companies. 26 The trickle down effect of lower profits has been passed to consumers and led to public discontent and scattered protests against increased tariffs on imported goods and rising transit fees. 27 As long as the economy remains dependent on energy exports, Russia faces declining income unless the cost of oil stabilizes and significant investment flows into the energy sector.
The majority of Russian oil and gas production is from a small number of mature fields and there has been limited investment in infrastructure and development of new fields. The Russian government has expanded its control over the country's energy supplies in the last decade. The state owns 51% of Gazprom's shares, the Russian natural gas monopoly, and 30% of oil production through the government-owned oil firms Rosneft and Gazprom Neft. 34 It also controls oil and refined product pipelines through the state firm Transneft. 35 Transneft is the largest shareholder in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which grants Russia a near monopoly to transport Kazakh oil destined for Western markets. 36 Foreign enterprises are not permitted to own more than 20 percent of shares in any one company. 37 State officials occupy the boards of corporations like Gazprom, Rosneft, and Transneft to ensure that Russia's largest corporations act in the public interest. 38 Prime Minister Vladimir Putin "does not trust foreign ownership and does not consider privatization as 'the best way in diversifying Russia's economy and generating revenue.'" 39 He supports the idea of protecting private property, but believes private companies should not have more control than the state, since only the state represents the interests of the people. 40 Putin believes the country's natural resources secure its international status and ensure economic development and "the state should set the priorities of the energy sector and the companies involved to benefit both the state and the Russian people." 41 He has surrounded himself with former KGB associates, who share his aim to reestablish, preserve, and extend the authority and influence of the state. 42 The blurred distinction between government and business in the energy sector has raised questions about the Kremlin's political motives.
The Tap and Transit Weapons Threat
Analysts speculate Russia's state-controlled energy and transit companies have been used as foreign policy instruments against neighboring countries. In his book Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism, Janusz Bugajski argues Moscow aims to prolong and deepen European dependence on Russian energy supplies because "economic vulnerability is a mechanism for both financial profit and political leverage." 43 Currently, consumer states that cannot remedy their dependence on Russian gas are the most vulnerable in the short and long-term. 44 According to Bertil Nygren, author of Putin's Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region, there are two types of energy weapons: the "tap weapon" and the "transit weapon." 45 The tap weapon allows Russia to shut off gas supplies while the transit weapon coerces countries to sell its natural gas to Russia for the offered price, or pay high transit fees to use its pipelines. The strategic goal "is to gain control -not necessarily ownership -of the energy production and transit resources from the Soviet era and ultimately to control the economic (in addition to the security) arena of the CIS region." 46 In the winter of 2005, after the Orange Revolution installed a pro-western president in Kiev, Russia announced plans to implement market prices for gas deliveries to Ukraine. Prices were to increase three-fold and Ukraine vehemently objected, threatening to siphon gas from pipelines transiting its country bound for Europe. The gas war ended in January 2006, when Gazprom and the Ukranian government reached a compromise. In
July 2008, Transneft announced that oil deliveries to the Czech Republic would be cut from the monthly volume of 500,000 to 300,000 tons for technical reasons. Analysts speculate it is not a coincidence the announcement came two days after the US and Czech governments signed an agreement to deploy a US missile defense system to Czech territory. 47 Since Russia has demonstrated its willingness to use energy for political blackmail, there is concern that energy dependent countries are sensitive to Russian policies to protect Russian interests. Belarus accepting higher prices, but still below the market rate, in exchange for a greater Russian share in the Belarusian gas pipelines. 51 Other countries have also made agreements with the Kremlin that limited their control. Yukos, a Russian firm, gained majority control of a Lithuanian refinery by slowing oil supply and buying it at a reduced price. 52 In January 2006, Ukraine transferred control of its gas import policy to a nontransparent intermediary company, RosUkrEnergo, which supplies Ukraine with natural gas originating from the territories of the Russian Federation. 53 That same year Gazprom threatened to increase gas prices to Armenia but agreed to a smaller increase for significant control of the construction of a gas pipeline transiting from Iran. 54 If fully developed, the pipeline would make Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, and the EU less dependent on Russian gas. 55 In November 2006, Gazprom increased its share of the pipeline's operator, ArmRosGazprom, to 58 percent. 56 The Kremlin's energy dynasty assures a level of influence in the former satellite countries.
Russia is seeking alliances with other dominant energy players. Moscow is interested in cooperation with the energy sector of several states in the Gulf region. In the past four years, the Kremlin has signed numerous agreements to protect investments and promote economic cooperation with Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Qatar. In addition, Moscow agreed to a 40-year contract with the Saudi government to explore and develop a natural gas field in the Rub el Hali desert. "Saudi Arabia and Russia are the two main producers of oil, and Russia is interested in the idea of forming a gas cartel with Iran and Qatar." 57 As an ally and opponent of the 68 The US and Baltic countries are concerned the new pipeline will give Moscow more leverage on energy issues. 69 The success or failure of these projects depend more on whether energy firms find them profitable and less dependent on US diplomatic skill. 70 Although the US imports a minimal amount of Russian oil, it has a vital interest in Russian business policies. Oil has proven to be a magnet for conflict, a weapon for petro-states, and a stimulant for terrorism. The US depends on foreign imports for nearly 60 percent of its energy needs, and future requirements are projected to rise to 70 percent by 2025. 71 Analysts speculate world oil demand will grow by 50 percent in the next 15 years, causing competition for energy resources to be an increasing source of tension. 72 Thus, US policymakers encourage opening, integrating, and diversifying energy markets to ensure global energy security. The
2006 National Security Strategy pledged to work with resource-rich countries to increase their openness, transparency, and rule of law and specifically committed to work with Russia for its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 73 The US administration is aware the world's dependence on a few suppliers is neither responsible nor sustainable over the long term and is also investing in alternative energy sources. 74 However, there is no acceptable replacement on the near horizon and Russia's role in geopolitics may strengthen as Europe and the US remain dependent on oil.
Summation of Driving Forces
The driving forces that are the most important and most uncertain are known as critical uncertainties, and they are the foundation of the future scenario set. 75 The driving forces will frame the thesis question: How will Russia's energy policies influence future US and European energy security and national interests? The research shows that Russia has slowly acquired state control of the energy market and benefitted from an economic boom supported by high oil prices. Russia's methods to secure its prosperity are uncertain as oil and gas fields mature and investment stagnates. To capture the uncertainty of Russia's methods to maintain a stronghold in the energy market, one axis will be labeled: open market and closed market. "Open market"
refers to a spirit of cooperation and transparent policies encouraging foreign investment in Russia. "Closed market" represents a government centric approach with guarded policies that deter foreign investment. The second axis will address the uncertainty of the US and EU's capability to achieve oil independence and the impact that would have on Russia. This axis will be labeled: energy dependent and energy independent.
There are also predetermined driving forces that will guide the scenario development.
There may be occasional dips and spikes of oil per barrel over the next 15 years, but the price will generally increase in the future as global demand grows, oil fields mature, and the possibility of discovering massive oil fields becomes more unlikely. In addition, the US and European administrations will continue promoting development of alternative energy sources.
Finally, for the purpose of this research, energy independence will be defined as the state's ability to maintain self-sufficiency in its energy needs by producing the amount it consumes through technological advancement, diversification projects, and shifts in policies.
Chapter 3 -Scenario Building
The next portion of the research synthesizes the critical uncertainties into fictional stories of a possible future. The future paths represented in Figure 3 .0 illustrate the balance of the West's pursuit for energy independence against Russia's ability to maintain a nominal role in the energy sector. The scenarios are not intended to be predictive, they are designed to stretch thinking about the opportunities and threats the future might hold, and guide short and long-term strategic decisions. 76 Each scenario provides a snapshot of the US, Europe, and Russia in the future world. The oil curtain that descended across the globe became undeniably visible in 2025. Oil production peaked five years earlier, nearly a decade after most geologists predicted. 77 Since then, import laden nations have been on a quest to secure resources, thus increasing competition and tension between major consuming states like the US, China, and India. While the EU and US took strides to reduce their dependence on oil the past 15 years, it remains one of their primary sources of energy. US oil imports are up from 60 to 70 percent as predicted, 78 Oil dependence has strengthened oil-exporting nations that oppose US and European interests.
US oil prices skyrocketed in 2021when the Venezuelan president threatened to cut supplies in protest of American involvement over a conflict between Venezuela and Colombia. The price of energy also drove the growth of inflation and trade deficits. Since the price of imported oil spiked in 2020 with the realization that oil production peaked, many importers had to increase their money supply to offset their trade deficits.
The demand for oil and gas has enabled Russia to continually turn inward. The few foreign companies investing in the energy sector are firmly under government control limiting creativity, competition, and technological advancement. The lack of development in new oil and gas fields, infrastructure, and technology caused energy shortages and an unavoidable gap between demand and supply. Russia cut exports for several weeks to provide for the domestic market the last three years. The high oil prices have generated substantial funds for the Russian economy; however, it has also caused high inflation. Since 2020, consumer price inflation rose to 17 percent, and producer prices grew to 25 percent, reminiscent of increases during 2007, which rose to 11.9 percent and 17 percent. 83 Russia's high inflation and rift in distribution of oil wealth have led to political instability. and price controls come to fruition, the US and EU economies will be vulnerable to nations who do not have US and EU best interests in mind.
Despite strides to achieve energy independence, Americans and Europeans are still dependent on imports. There is nominal diversification in hydrocarbons, wind, electricity, and biofuels; but nothing substantial altering European and American ways of life. Meanwhile, the petro-dependent state of Russia, has become more aggressive and protective of its resources and actively uses energy to influence neighboring states and dictate policy. nautical mile zone and beyond that up to 150 nautical miles of rights to the seabed. 84 The UN rejected this claim for lack of evidence and the US, Canada, Norway, Denmark, and
Greenlandare also seeking rights to the region. In the past five years, Russia has reinforced its Northern Fleet and border guard forces.
The US and EU's dependence on imports has weakened their political power and economic stability. US oil imports climbed from 60%, in 2008, to 70% as projected by analysts, 85 In conclusion, the geopolitical power scale is slowly tilting toward Russia and the East.
The Kremlin's open business policies enabled major investment in its energy infrastructure as the world grew more dependent on fossil fuels. Despite the desire for energy independence, the US remains one of the world's largest importers of oil, second only to China, and EU imports have grown by 10 percent. Russia's strong economy has strengthened its soft power while the US is mindful of its economic vulnerability. The state-controlled energy market experienced highs and lows during the past 15 years.
Lack of investment from foreign companies stalled technological improvements in development, infrastructure, and transportation. Initially, Europe's reduction of gas imports significantly affected the Russian economy; however, Russia rebounded from much of the shock with expanded exports to countries such as India, Japan, and China. In 2022, the completion of an oil pipeline linking Siberia with China boosted Moscow's export capability and elevated it from the fifth-largest exporter of crude oil to energy-hungry China in 2008, 88 to second in today's market.
However, China is not considered an optimum market. Chinese consumption is expected to decline as it seeks to reduce dependence on imports by increasing use of its vast domestic reserves of coal. 89 Thus, Russia may once again find itself in a slump in the next decade unless it can diversify economically.
The world today represents two diverging worlds, those seeking a future free from oil and those clinging to the past few decades. The US and EU have achieved a sense of energy independence by cutting back on energy use and developing alternatives. Russia is seeking to maintain its economic growth by spreading into new markets, but it is slow to develop with its closed market ideology. There is a growing rift between Russia and the West's economic and diplomatic policies.
Chapter 4 -Conclusion and Recommendations
In the past decade, there has been noticeable growth of Russia's economic wealth and political power. The EU's dependency on Russian oil and gas combined with Moscow's pipeline politics have spurred debate among political analysts of Russia's emerging threat to energy security. The US and EU have yet to implement a comprehensive plan that addresses the rising challenges facing states dependent on energy imported from countries that may not have their best interests in mind. This research does not recommend a single approach or set of policies, nor does it support a particular argument. Rather, the intent is to generate ideas and a fresh approach to stimulate strategic discussion.
Summary of Findings
The scenario study in Chapter 3 illustrates that a strategic landscape that promotes both critical uncertainties to gravitate toward energy independence and a Russian open market will bring about the optimal future titled "Energy Pioneers." This desired end state not only assures EU and US sustainability as the world treads toward peaking oil production, it enables government leaders to interact in the global arena without influence from exporting nations.
Russia will continue to operate in its best interests, as can be expected from any state. However, the open market will assure continued growth while the world moves toward alternative energies.
Moscow's strength will enable domestic and regional stability. Conversely, minimal progress toward energy independence and a closed market economy may lead to the worst case scenario, "The Oil Curtain."
The research employed the phases of Scearce and Fulton's scenario-thinking model, with the exception of the Act phase (see Table 4 .0). During the Act phase an organization learns, adapts, and takes effective action. In addition, the organization identifies patterns and insights that emerge as building blocks for a strategic agenda that makes progress toward long-term goals. 90 There would be little value added in role playing a scenario, therefore, this research defers the Act phase to decision makers and think tanks. 92 At a minimum, the US and EU should implement policies that promote energy independence and continue monitoring Russia's energy policies.
The final phase, Monitor, recommends identifying leading indicators that act as warning signs of a potential future. Indicators promoting energy independence will be evident in the government and civilian sector. Government incentives promoting development and use of alternative energy, strict emission regulations, and new legislation are signs that state leaders are moving toward energy independence. Other indicators include investing in domestic production and diversifying imports. From the civilian sector, massive shifts to "green" products, mass transit and fuel-efficient vehicles also trend toward energy independence. Russia's advance toward openness will also be played out on the global stage. While privatizing state-controlled firms may be interpreted as an act toward openness, it does not guarantee cross-border relations.
Corruption and bad policies can still exist under these conditions. However, legislation that promotes business transparency and fair property, licensing, and tax legislation, will encourage investment. No matter what scenario unfolds, Moscow will likely take strides to maintain a sphere of influence in the former Soviet states. As long as they remain dependent on Russian oil, they are subject to Kremlin policies. This paper argues the EU's ability to protect the Baltic
States is based on its energy independence.
Recommendations
Although the US and EU recognize energy independence as an important factor to security, their current courses of action appear to make little progress in that direction. However, history demonstrates new political administrations often offer fresh ideas and renewed vigor to implement policy changes. This would be an ideal time to implement scenario thinking to seek new possibilities, reexamine US energy issues, and ask the tough questions. "Scenarios are designed to stretch our thinking about the opportunities and threats that the future might hold, and to weigh those opportunities and threats carefully when making both short-term and longterm strategic decisions." 93 This research provides a launching point for an independent study group, congressional committee, or combined team of economists, environmentalists, and foreign experts to delve into the issue, pursue additional dimensions, and develop a strategic plan. Currently, energy issues tend to focus on the environment; this study would analyze it from a security standpoint and make recommendations to political leaders. As much as the government plays in implementing policy, the public must also support new measures and be willing to make changes.
The US is responsible for its own path and although cross talks with the EU and Russia can encourage cooperation, ultimately leaders will act in what they consider to be the nation's best interests. The indicators discussed earlier will provide insight into which future each state may be approaching. Armed with that knowledge, the US can poise itself for the best outcome.
